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Abstract: The EU Large Combustion Plant Directive (LCPD) is a major but
largely unstudied environmental regulation. Most of the 1585 large
combustion plants in this analysis are electricity supply plants or combined
heat and power plants. We find that, controlling for country characteristics
and plant size, plants in the electricity supply, combined heat and power,
district heating, and paper industries have a higher probability of being optedout of the emission limit values (ELVs), which necessitates eventual plant
closure. Controlling for plant size and industry, increasing the amount of solid
fuel or natural gas utilized at a plant is associated with a decreased likelihood
of being opted-out of the ELVs.
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In January 2008, the European Union (EU) implemented the
Large Combustion Plant Directive (LCPD) regulation, which requires
large plants to limit emissions in all member countries in order to
protect the environment and improve the economic welfare of EU
citizens. Starting January 1, 2008, the LCPD mandates that large
combustion plants, with rated thermal inputs of 50 MWth or higher,
limit emissions of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, and particulate matter
(dust). The benefits of reducing these emissions include lower human
exposure to pollutants that cause adverse health effects and less
damage to ecosystems. However, there are compliance costs to this
environmental policy, which can vary significantly by plant. Moreover,
not every plant is required to respond to the LCPD in the same way.
Specifically, the “limited life derogation clause” allows a plant to be
“opted-out” of the LCPD emission limit values (ELVs) prescribed by the
legislation provided that it will shut down after 20,000 h of operation.
In this paper we take the first step toward quantifying the costs of the
LCPD by identifying plant characteristics that associate positively with
an increased probability of being opted-out of the ELVs.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that firms are choosing to shut
down plants because of the LCPD. For example, E.ON UK stated that
its power plants without flue gas desulphurization (FGD) would be
opted-out of the directive and shut down by 2015.1 This includes the
company's Ironbridge, Kingsnorth, and Grain power stations. It is
unclear whether there might be an asymmetric response to the LCPD
based upon the fuel mix or the size of the plant since the emission
limits vary based upon these characteristics. It may be that plants of a
certain type are impacted more than others. Furthermore, differences
in industry structure can affect the likelihood of plants being opted-out
of the LCPD.
The primary goal of this research is to examine how different
industries and fuel mixes are associated with the election of the limited
life derogation clause of the LCPD. The majority of plants subject to
the LCPD are electricity supply plants and combined heat and power
plants; it is important for policy-makers to understand whether plants
in these two industries are more likely to be opted-out of the
ELVs.Solid fuels such as coal have earned a reputation for causing
more adverse health effects than natural gas. Yet some EU countries,
such as Poland, have a robust coal mining industry that employs many
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people and generates much income (Suwala, 2010; Uliasz-Bochenczyk
and Mokrzycki, 2007). Hence, although it may be economically
efficient to avoid health-care costs by reducing emissions from burning
coal, there may also be political costs from adversely affecting the coal
industry.2
We construct a dataset spanning 17 EU countries with a total of
1585 large combustion plants including all plants that were or were
not opted-out of the LCPD.3 Starting in 2004, each member country
was required by the LCPD to report information on their large
combustion plants. Using probit regression, we find that plants in the
paper, energy supply, combined heat and power, and district heating
industries have a higher probability of being opted-out of the LCPD
limits. Plant characteristics are also important; larger plants have a
higher probability of being opted-out while plants that use more solid
fuel (such coal and lignite) and more natural gas have a lower
probability of being opted-out. We also find that plants operating in
less competitive markets have a lower probability of being opted-out.
Command-and-control regulations are generally considered less
efficient than incentive based policies, such as a tax or tradable
permits.4 An interesting aspect of the LCPD is that countries can either
choose to entirely follow the command-and-control ELVs or design
their own national plan that would achieve the same overall level of
emission reductions. A country that designs its own incentive based
policy plan should be able to achieve the emission reductions at a
lower overall cost. Also, a country that incorporates an emissions tax
or a tradable emissions permit system into its plan would give
individual plants more flexibility to comply with regulations. Therefore,
we investigate whether or not plants in countries with national
emission reduction plans have lower opt-out probabilities. Six (6) of
the 17 EU countries we examine (Estonia, Finland, France, Greece,
Portugal, and UK) designed their own national emission plans to
reduce emissions as set by the LCPD. Confirming our theoretical
expectations, we find that plants in these countries are opted out at
lower probabilities.

2. Previous literature
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Policymakers regularly debate the economic effects of
environmental regulation. The LCPD is an example of command-andcontrol (direct) regulation. Theoretically, command-and-control
regulation has limitations, particularly in terms of potential loss of
economic efficiency when marginal abatement costs differ across
firms. That is, command-and-control regulation may not minimize the
cost of achieving a given pollution reduction goal. Yet, “there remains
a need for more empirical evidence on the economic efficiency of direct
regulation” (Iraldo et al., 2011). The relationships among
environmental regulation, firm performance, and economic
competitiveness are complex and may vary by context (Haq et al.,
2001; Iraldo et al., 2011).
The LCPD is a major step towards reducing pollution in the
European Union but the policy has received little academic analysis.
Papers providing descriptive historical background on the LCPD include
Ramus (1991) and Markusson (2012). Eames (2001) finds that
countries comply with the regulation but costs associated with
compliance vary at the national level. The paper was written before
countries started reporting data required by European Environmental
Agency (EEA) on plant emissions. Therefore, there is no analysis
conducted on the effects of the directive on plants and industries.
Although we are not directly examining a causal relationship
between regulation and plant exit, the limited literature on the survival
or exit of polluting plants is informative. Jiang (2012) examines the US
refining industry, Chen (2002) studies the decline of industry due to
deregulation of crude oil markets, and Becker and Henderson (2000)
show that in response to emissions regulations, plants in industries
that pollute tend to close and relocate to areas with less strict
regulations.
More generally, a literature review by Jeppesen and Folmer
(2001) finds that stricter environmental policy is more likely to result
in closure as compared to relocation of plants or reduced location of
new plants. A recent survey by Millimet et al. (2009) concludes that
the theoretical literature shows that increasing absolute environmental
standards induces exit. Empirical evidence appears to support this.
Henderson (1996) analyzes ground-level ozone regulation and finds
that plants exit or relocate from areas that are more heavily regulated.
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Snyder et al. (2003) find a similar result for chlorine-manufacturing
plants. Deily and Gray (1991) and Helland (1998) find that plants that
are less profitable or in declining industries are less likely to be
inspected and therefore have lower probability of exiting. Kassinis and
Vafeas (2009) compare the environmental performance of plants prior
to their closure against plants that do not close and find that plants
that close are subject to more regulatory pressure and reduce their
emissions more compared to plants that do not close. Yin et al. (2007)
find that environmental regulation can induce small firms to exit due to
economies of scale and liquidity constraints. In a comparative study of
power plants in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Višković et al.
(2014) find that differential exposure to the EU ETS negatively impacts
the more heavily regulated country, Croatia, in terms of economic
competitiveness. Thus, most empirical evidence suggests that
increased regulation can lead to decreased firm competitiveness.
Nonetheless, theories and findings are not uniform concerning the
effects of environmental regulation; utilizing a Delphi method survey,
Korhonen et al. (2015) find that experts view tightening of
environmental regulations in the pulp and paper industry as both a
threat and an opportunity to businesses. Environmental regulation as
an opportunity is consistent with the “Porter induced innovation
hypothesis,” which states that environmental regulations spur firm
innovation and hence increase firm competitiveness (Porter and van
der Linde, 1995).

3. Description of the LCPD
The EU adopted the LCPD in October 2001, with the regulations
taking effect January 2008.5 An EU directive, the LCPD requires
Member States to reduce emissions of sulphur dioxide, nitrogen
oxides, and particulate matter from combustion plants with a rated
thermal input of 50 MWth or more (Ritchie et al., 2005). Plants with
thermal input of this scale include electricity plants, combined heat
and power plants (CHP), district heating plants, oil refineries, sugar
refineries, chemical manufacturers, and large industrial manufacturers
(such as steelworks plants). The regulations are different for existing
plants (licensed before 1 July 1987) and for new plants (licensed after
July 1, 1987). For existing plants, member States can choose between
complying with ELVs and implementing a national emission reduction
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plan. All new plants must comply, although ELVs vary by the size of
the plant and the fuel that is burned; in general, ELVs are more
stringent for larger plants. Liquid fuels (such as oil) and solid fuels
(such as coal) have more lenient ELVs than does natural gas.
The Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland,
Portugal, and the UK all submitted national emission reduction plans
(Ritchie et al., 2005). This means that these Member States must
reduce aggregate emissions for the country to the same levels that
would have been achieved by applying the ELVs to existing plants in
2000. Relative to the situation where are all plants of a certain size
and fuel type are given identical limits, this should give more flexibility
to the Member States. The efficiency gains from this flexibility will
theoretically depend upon the level of firm heterogeneity, with more
heterogeneity leading to greater cost savings.
One exception to the LCPD regulations is the so-called “limited
life derogation clause”. As noted by (Ritchie et al., 2005), “an operator
of an existing plant may be exempted from compliance with the ELVs
(emission limit values) and from inclusion in a national emission
reduction plan if a written undertaken was submitted to the competent
authority by 30 June 2004, not to operate the plant for more than
20,000 operational hours starting from 1 January 2008 and ending no
later than 31 December 2015”. This limited life derogation clause
would thus require permanent closure of the plant after 20,000 h of
operation. To put this in perspective, a plant operating for a little less
than seven hours a day would be completely shut-down by 2015. If
run continuously for 24 h a day, firms opting for the limited life
derogation would have shut down by March of 2010.
The Industrial Emissions Directive (IED), approved by plenary
vote in the European Parliament on July 7, 2010 (Nind & Cronin, n.d.),
supplanted the LCPD. The IED tightened emission limits beyond what
was required by the LCPD beginning in 2016. It is important to note
that the IED has no bearing on the pre-existing requirements of the
LCPD (Nind & Cronin, n.d.). That is, the LCPD is irrevocable and the
plants that were opted-out of the LCPD must still have been closed by
the end of 2015.

4. Conceptual framework
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According to the standard theory of the firm, a firm will exit a
competitive industry in the long run if they are realizing an economic
loss. For large combustion plants, profitability is based upon plant
output level, plant costs, and the price of the output good. In addition
to typical fixed and variable costs, the EU plants were faced with an
additional abatement cost when the LCPD went into effect. While the
regulations apply to all EU plants, the limits vary based upon the
characteristics of the plant. Specifically, different limits apply to plants
of different sizes and fuel types. The cost of complying with identical
limits may also vary from plant to plant.
In the long run, a plant is opted-out of the ELVs if projected
economic profit under the ELVs < 0. We assume that the probability of
opting out of the LCPD depends upon the characteristics of the plant
and a random draw. Thus, the probability of opting out due to a
projected negative economic profit is represented by:
(1)
We do not directly observe price, output, capital, labor, fuel
cost, competition, or abatement costs. Capital is proxied by the MWth
rating of the plant. We construct a rough Herfindahl Index using total
energy input to proxy competition, which also provides information
about output price relative to cost. Depending on the current physical
state of the plant, abatement costs may or may not drastically
increase with the passage of the LCPD. Plants without FGD, for
example, would face very large increases in abatement costs to
comply with the SO2 limits of the directive. These plants must then
project their economic profit, factoring in the increased abatement
costs of installing FGD.
Some of the plants would have remained in the industry in the
absence of the LCPD, but the additional LCPD abatement costs would
cause them to incur an economic loss. Thus, the firm chooses to optout of the ELVs and, hence, shut down after 20,000 h of operation.
However, it is likely that some plants would project an economic loss
irrespective of the LCPD. We would not want to misattribute their
eventually exit to the LCPD. The timing of the opt-out decision helps to
separate out these two possibilities. Recall that the opt-out decision
had to be submitted by 30 June 2004 but the ELVs did not apply until
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2008. That is, opting-out would not provide any benefit during the
years of 2004–2007. It is unlikely that a plant would be opted-out of
the ELVs if it was expected to exit the industry by the end of 2007.
Furthermore, we observe fuel usage and industrial emissions through
2009, so we can see if there are any plants that were opted-out of the
legislation and shut-down prior to the ELVs taking effect in 2008.
There is no significant difference in the percentages of opted-out
plants that report 0 total energy input by 2007 (15.4%) versus the
non-opted-out plants that report 0 total energy input by 2007
(10.8%).6 However, from an ex-ante perspective in 2004, it also
possible that plants with better long-range planning would plan to
continue operating through 2007 but to exit in 2008 or later regardless
of the LCPD. For these plants, being opted-out of ELVs in 2004 would
have minimized compliance costs, but eventual exit was anticipated.
Therefore, we take the position that we are analyzing the decision to
opt-out plants from the ELVs and acknowledge that the opt-out choice
may have been for reasons unrelated to the legislation.
One primary aim is to empirically analyze which, if any,
industries have been most impacted by the LCPD opt-out decision after
controlling for the size of the plant and country characteristics.
Furthermore, we form several testable hypotheses regarding the
characteristics of plants. All else equal, we hypothesize the following.
1.
Plants using dirtier fuels, such as coal, would face larger
abatement costs to comply with the LCPD, and hence would
exhibit face a higher probability of opting-out of the ELVs. For
example, approximately 95 percent of the sulphur in coal is
emitted as SO2 during combustion and 80 to 90 percent of ash
in coal leaves the boilers along with the flue gases as particulate
matter (Loyd and Craigie, 2011). Controlling these emissions
generally requires installing expensive capital upgrades.
2.
Countries with national emissions reduction plans have more
flexibility in how they achieve their emissions reductions than
countries that rely solely on the LCPD ELVs. Hence, plants in
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these countries should exhibit a lower probability of opting-out
of the ELVs.
3.
Plants in less competitive industries have more market power
and should be more profitable. Therefore, these plants should
exhibit a lower probability of opting-out of the ELVs.

5. Data
The data for our analysis come directly from the European
Environmental Agency (EEA). Each EU member country is responsible
for tracking and reporting data to the EEA on all plants that have
megawatt thermal (MWth) greater than 50. The EEA has collected
several waves of the LCPD data; the first wave spans years 2004–
2006 and the second wave includes years 2007–2009. As of January
2017, EEA has released data through 2014.7 Through plant matching,
we combine the first two waves to obtain one dataset that includes a
total of 3401 plants for the years 2004 to 2009.8 The dataset contains
information on various energy inputs, total energy used by plants,
MWth, and plant emissions on an annual basis.
Only plants from the following 17 countries were opted-out of
the LCPD: Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Greece,
Spain, Finland, France, Latvia, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Slovenia, Slovak Republic, and United Kingdom. We therefore focus
only on the 1585 plants in these countries.9 Out of these plants, 194
plants were opted out of the LCPD. Table 1 shows the breakdown of
plants by country and by opt-out decision.
Table 1. Breakdown of plants by opt-out decision in each country.
Country Not opted-out Opted-out Total
Belgium 97

3

100

Bulgaria 34

2

36

Cyprus

1

3

2

32

2

Denmark 30

[Utilities Policy, Vol 45, (April 2017): pg. 61-68. DOI. This article is © [Elsevier] and permission has been granted for this
version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. [Elsevier] does not grant permission for this article to be further
copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from [Elsevier].]

9

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

Country Not opted-out Opted-out Total
Estonia

15

2

17

Finland

182

21

203

France

264

24

288

Greece

58

2

60

Latvia

26

3

29

Malta

6

4

10

Poland

65

31

96

Portugal 24

3

27

Romania 143

41

184

Slovakia 67

9

76

Slovenia 16

2

18

Spain

130

23

153

UK

232

21

253

Total

1391

194

1585

We identify the industry for each plant in the dataset using the
reported information supplemented by a manual search. A majority of
plants identified the sector in which they were operating in the second
wave of the LCPD. There were six classifications given: Electricity
Supply Industry (ES), Combined Heat and Power (CHP) plants, District
Heating (DH), Iron and Steel, Refineries, and Other non-refineries. In
total, 1336 plants were labeled with these classifications. For the
missing plants and for the category of other non-refineries, we
conducted a search using plant and firm websites and other sources to
identify the sectors of the remaining plants. Table 2 shows the final
classification of our plants by sector. The largest sectors are ES, CHP,
DH, and refineries. We also see that the ES sector has the largest
number of opt-outs. In the appendix, we provide the breakdown of
firms in our dataset by country and sector.
Table 2. Breakdown of plants by opt-out decision in each
industry.
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Industry

Not opted-out Opted-out Total

Sugar

48

3

51

Paper

38

5

43

Chemicals

70

0

70

Refining

151

3

154

Iron/Steel

31

1

32

Electricity Supply (ES)

353

86

439

Combined Heat and Power (CHP) 406

55

461

District Heating (DH)

143

37

180

Other

73

4

76

Other Unknown

79

0

79

Total

1391

194

1585

For our dependent variable we use the information on each optout decision to construct a dummy variable opt-out, which is a value of
1 if a firm decided to opt-out a plant at the beginning of 2004 and 0 if
not. Emissions and energy usage must still be reported for opted-out
plants because they still have 20,000 h to operate before they must
shut down. The dataset also contains information on each plants'
megawatt thermal (MWth) combustion capacity, which we use as our
measure of plant size.10 The dataset does not include information on
plant output but does include various measures of energy inputs. The
fuel used by plants includes biomass input, other solid fuels, liquid
fuels, natural gas, and other gas. We also have total energy input for
each plant (total energy input), which is obtained by summing all
energy used. We note that “other solid fuels” contains coal and lignite.
Table 3 provides summary statistics for each of the variables.
Table 3. Summary statistics for all variables.
Variable

Mean Std. Dev. Min

Max

Obs.

MWth

455.1 869.9614 35

12069

Biomass

127.2 519.178

0

6200.598 1244

Other solid fuel 4186 15196.35 0

267553.5 1244

Liquid fuel

38396.18 1244

490.1 1866.198 0

1519

[Utilities Policy, Vol 45, (April 2017): pg. 61-68. DOI. This article is © [Elsevier] and permission has been granted for this
version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. [Elsevier] does not grant permission for this article to be further
copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from [Elsevier].]

11

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

Variable

Mean Std. Dev. Min

Max

Obs.

Natural gas

1739 5026.634 0

83749.52 1244

Other gas

357.7 1256.813 0

13965.76 1244

Note: Energy input measures are in terajoules (TJ).
We first examine whether plants that were opted-out differ in
their observable characteristics from the plants that chose to remain
under the ELVs of the LCPD for each industry. In Table 4, we compare
these plants within each industry using the five main firm
characteristics: MWth, Biomass, Other solid fuel, Liquid fuel, Natural
gas, and Other gas.Table 4 shows that opted-out paper plants burn
significantly more Other solid fuel than plants that would comply with
the LCPD ELVs. For the refining industry, opted-out plants burn
significantly less Natural gas. In the ES industry, opted-out plants burn
more Liquid fuel and less Natural gas. Opted-out CHP plants tend to be
larger, burn more Other solid fuel and less Biomass, Liquid fuel, and
Natural gas. Finally, in the DH industry, opted-out plants are larger
and burn more Other solid fuel, less Liquid fuel, and less Other gas.
Table 4. Comparing means of variables plants based on opt-out
decision.
Sector

Variable

Not Opted-Out Opted-Out t-test
Sugar

MWth

116.22

107.39

0.76

Biomass

a

a

b

Other solid fuel 129.33

245.00

b

Liquid fuel

156.76

808.00

b

Natural gas

209.94

0.00

b

Other gas

1.97

0.00

b

Paper
MWth

107.71

242.90

−1.62

Biomass

532.69

700.95

−0.23

1964.09

−2.72**

Other solid fuel 268.94
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Sector

Variable

Not Opted-Out Opted-Out t-test

Liquid fuel

112.32

35.36

1.47

Natural gas

384.36

158.24

1.37

Other gas

1.07

4.05

−0.71

Refining
MWth

224.53

851.33

−1.06

Biomass

a

a

b

Other solid fuel 127.42

0.00

1.00

Liquid fuel

1287.77

19232.06

−0.94

Natural gas

426.97

0.00

3.23***

Other gas

1760.10

1284.24

0.49

Iron/Steel
MWth

219.52

1199.00

b

Biomass

a

a

b

Other solid fuel 624.75

6363.60

b

Liquid fuel

244.79

244.79

b

Natural gas

281.46

47.28

b

Other gas

2826.59

5716.88

b

Electricity Supply (ES)
MWth

993.93

1180.92

−1.27

Biomass

118.19

121.95

−0.07

Other solid fuel 10990.43

7918.28

1.21

Liquid fuel

640.48

1313.42

−2.09**

Natural gas

4021.99

1101.47

4.97***

Other gas

193.03

379.46

−1.08

Combined Heat and Power (CHP)
MWth

294.45

430.69

−1.91*

Biomass

273.46

10.21

6.40***

Other solid fuel 2407.99

4091.88

−1.78*

Liquid fuel

127.72

49.61

2.30**

Natural gas

1754.26

354.33

4.92***
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Sector

Variable
Other gas

Not Opted-Out Opted-Out t-test
87.79

29.68

1.45

District Heating (DH)
MWth

139.27

183.87

−1.70*

Biomass

4.28

0.98

1.58

Other solid fuel 39.19

321.26

−1.85*

Liquid fuel

66.00

20.38

2.99***

Natural gas

360.47

272.35

0.70

Other gas

1.38

0.00

1.71*

Note: Values represent means. Fuel is in terajoules (TJ). a: no
observations for this industry. b: too few observations within industry
to conduct t-tests. *Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%,
***Significant at 1%.
We also measure firm concentration and competition for each
industry and country using the Herfindahl Index. Because the dataset
does not provide any output measures or sales, we use total energy
input as a proxy measure to construct our Herfindahl Index. Energy
input should be positively correlated with output but using energy
input as proxy for output ignores differences in productivity across
plants. Furthermore, we acknowledge that we only observe large
plants in our analysis and the Herfindahl Index may not be appropriate
for some sectors since we do not know how many firms operate in
each sector. For some sectors, there may exist small firms (MWth <
50) that have a good portion of market share in these industries. The
Herfindahl Index ranges from 0 to 1, where industries with a value
closer to 1 are generally less competitive and plants have greater
market power. Table 5 summarizes the Herfindahl Index for each
industry.11
Table 5. Herfindahl Indices by industry.
Sector

Mean Std. Dev. Obs.

Sugar

0.15

0.18

51

Paper

0.25

0.28

43
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Sector

Mean Std. Dev. Obs.

Chemicals

0.13

0.19

69

Refining

0.12

0.17

154

Iron/Steel

0.38

0.29

32

Electricity Supply (ES)

0.06

0.06

439

Combined Heat and Power (CHP) 0.06

0.13

461

District Heating (DH)

0.07

0.08

180

Other

0.12

0.18

77

Other Unknown

0.28

0.36

79

6. Results
We begin by looking at the impact of the LCPD on industries as
classified in Table 2. We first estimate the following probit model on a
cross-section of plant level observations12:
(2)
where MWTH is the plant's size, Ii, are indicator variables for each
industry, and cj are country controls. Our dependent variable is Optouti, which is equal to 1 if a plant was opted-out of the LCPD and will
shut down by 2015 and 0 if a plant complies with the LCPD ELVs. The
results for this specification are in Table 6. Specification I of Table 6
shows results without controlling for plant size or country differences.
We drop the Refinery industry for collinearity and all coefficients
presented are relative to this industry.13 We see that the coefficients
on Paper, ES, CHP, and DH industries are positive and highly
significant. Thus, an average plant in these four industries has a higher
probability of opting-out of the LCPD relative to plants in the Refinery
industry. For example, plants in the ES industry, on average, are 30.5
percentage points more likely to be opted-out relative to Refineries.
Table 6. Probit regression results for opt-out by industry.
Specification Specification Specification
I
II
III
Sugar

0.127

0.133

0.105
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Specification Specification Specification
I
II
III
(0.112)

(0.113)

(0.108)

0.254∗∗

0.266∗∗∗

0.236∗∗

(0.126)

(0.127)

(0.127)

0.045

0.046

0.026

(0.121)

(0.122)

(0.103)

0.305∗∗∗

0.290∗∗∗

0.295∗∗∗

(0.069)

(0.070)

(0.069)

Combined Heat and 0.209∗∗∗
Power (CHP)
(0.065)

0.214∗∗∗

0.158∗∗∗

(0.065)

(0.063)

0.371∗∗∗

0.382∗∗∗

0.280∗∗∗

(0.091)

(0.091)

(0.097)

0.107

0.115

0.108

(0.097)

(0.098)

(0.096)

0.000019∗∗

0.0000

(0.000)

(0.000)

Paper
Iron/Steel
Electricity Supply
(ES)

District Heating
(DH)
Other
MWth
Country FE

No

No

Yes

Pseudo R2

0.052

0.057

0.107

Observations

1437

1406

1406

Note: Coefficients represent average marginal effects on the
probability of being opted-out from the LCPD ELV's. Specifications I-III
represent three specifications of the probit model given by equation
(2) in the text. Standard errors are in parentheses and are robust.
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%.
Specification II adds plant size and the sign and significance of
coefficients for plants in Paper, ES, CHP, and DH industries remain
similar to those in specification I. The coefficient for MWth is positive
and significant implying that larger plants have a higher probability of
opting-out. In Specification III, we control for country differences
using a set of indicator variables and see that our results still hold.
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Next, we run our specifications to test the three hypotheses
stated in the conceptual framework:
(3)
where X are observable firm characteristics including MWth and fuel
usage, Hij is the Herfindahl Index as a measure of market
concentration for each industry i and country j, and NPj is an indicator
for plants in countries that selected to design their own national
emissions reduction plans. Table 7 presents results for these three
hypotheses. For our first hypothesis, we examine how fuel type
impacts the opt-out decision. We see in specification I that plants
burning higher levels of natural gas have a lower probability of optingout of the LCPD ELVs and plants burning higher amounts of liquid fuels
have a higher probability of opting-out. Controlling for plant size, we
see in specification II that the coefficients for Natural gas and Other
solid fuels are also negative and significant. We see that the size of
plants is also important as larger plants have a higher probability of
opting-out. In specification III, we add country controls and see again
that Natural gas and Other solid fuel remain negative and significant.
Table 7. Probit regression results for hypotheses 1, 2, and 3.
Specification
I
Biomass
Other solid fuel
Liquid fuel
Natural gas
Other gas
Herfindahl
Index

Specification
II

Specification
III

−0.028

−0.037

−0.047*

(0.023)

(0.027)

(0.024)

0.0002

−0.008***

−0.007***

(0.0005)

(0.002)

(0.002)

0.010**

−0.0001

0.003

(0.004)

(0.005)

(0.004)
−0.012

***

−0.021

***

−0.020***

(0.004)

(0.005)

(0.005)

−0.015

−0.016*

0.003

(0.011)

(0.010)

(0.008)

−0.184**

−0.158*

−0.027

(0.089)

(0.083)

(0.074)
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Specification
I
National Plan

Specification
II

Specification
III

−0.071***

−0.068***

−0.055***

(0.019)

(0.018)

(0.018)

0.0002

MWth

***

0.0001***

(0.0000)

(0.0000)

No

No

Yes

Pseudo R2

0.047

0.0934

0.142

Observations

1244

1236

1184

Industry FE

Note: Coefficients represent average marginal effects on the
probability of being opted-out from the LCPD ELV's. Specifications I-III
represent three specifications of the probit model given by equation
(3) in the text. Variables are scaled so that all fuel variables are in
petajoules. Standard errors are in parentheses and are robust.
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%.
For our second hypothesis, we test whether plants in countries
that selected national reduction plans instead of the LCPD ELVs had a
lower probability of exiting. We see that the dummy variable National
Plan is negative and highly significant in all three specifications of
Table 7. This means that plants located in countries with national
emission reduction plans have a 5.5 to 7.1 percentage point decrease
in the probability of opting-out as compared plants located in countries
that simply adopted the LCPD ELVs.
Finally, for our last hypothesis, we proposed that plants
operating in less competitive industries will be less likely to have been
opted-out. Plants in less competitive industries have generally more
market power which leads to higher profit and better ability to comply
with the LCPD regulation. In specification I of Table 7 the coefficient
for the Herfindahl Index is negative and significant meaning that as
competition decreases and firms have more market power, the
probability of opting-out is reduced. This is also true in specification II
where we control for plant size.

7. Discussion
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As expected, EU large combustion plants in different industries
are responding differently to the LCPD. We find that Paper, ES, CHP,
and DH plants have an increased probability of being opted-out of the
LCPD relative to Refinery plants. The marginal effect for these
industries ranges from 15.9 percentage points for CHP plants in
specification III of Table 6 to 38.2 percentage points for DH plants in
specification II of Table 6. Regardless of the reason for the decision to
opt out, the future composition of these industries, especially energy
utilities, will be changed because fewer plants will be in operation.
We have also stated three testable hypotheses in our conceptual
framework. Regarding the first hypothesis, we find that plants that
burn more natural gas and more other solid fuels (coal or lignite) have
lower probabilities of opting out of the LCPD and subsequently shutting
down. The finding for natural gas is expected. First, natural gas plants
tend to be newer and more likely than older plants to have better
pollution abatement technologies. Second, natural gas is a much
cleaner burning fuel than oil or coal so, even without significant
investments in pollution abatement technologies, emissions will tend
to be lower than other fuel types. There are several plausible
explanations for the unexpected finding for solid fuels. The ELVs
specified in the LCPD are much more lenient for solid fuels than for
natural gas. Policy makers wrote the law this way in part because of
the inherent differences in the emissions from different fuel types. It
might also be speculated that various industries, such as the coal
industry, were at least marginally successful in influencing the ELVs for
their fuel type. A second possible explanation is that a large portion of
coal plants had already installed FGD prior to the LCPD. It is generally
accepted that FGD controls between 90 and 99 percent of sulfur
dioxide emissions. The SO2 ELVs, therefore, may only be binding for
plants without FGD already installed. To the extent that the installation
of abatement technologies has not been cost prohibitive for coal
plants, the SO2 ELVs may not be stringent enough to force these
plants to shut down. Similar arguments can be made for the ELVs with
regard to NOx and particular matter. A third possible explanation is
that many countries still have large and reliable domestic coal mines.
Governments of these countries may be trying to find ways to help
coal plants remain in operation. This may be especially true in
countries that have state-owned coal fired plants and coal mines.
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We find support for our second hypothesis regarding a national
emission plan for certain countries. In Table 7, National Plan,
representing plants located in Estonia, Finland, France, Greece,
Portugal, and UK, is associated with a five to seven percentage point
decrease in the probability of opting-out of the LCPD. This evidence
suggests that plants in countries that took advantage of structuring
their national emission policy may be more likely to survive. Finally, as
reported in in Table 7, we find evidence in support of our third
hypothesis concerning market power where we show that plants in
industries with more market power have a lower probability of optingout. This is not surprising since more profitable firms should have
greater ability to make the capital investments necessary to reduce
emission levels as required by the LCPD ELVs.

8. Conclusions and policy Implications
With the enactment of the LCPD, the European Union made a
significant legislative commitment to limiting pollution by large
combustion plants. On the whole, this policy is expected to improve air
quality for EU citizens and have a positive effect on the environment.
To date, there has been little systematic analysis to determine how
plants with different characteristics and in different industries are
responding to the LCPD. We take the first step to better understand
which plants are being “opted-out” of the LCPD ELVs under the
“limited life derogation clause.” These plants are required to shut down
operations after 20,000 h starting in 2008.
We obtain data from the EEA for all 17 EU countries where firms
opted for the “limited life derogation clause” and merge this with
information about plant location, size, industry, and energy inputs. We
find that plants in the Paper, ES, CHP, and DH industries have a
significantly increased probability of opting-out of the LCPD ELVs and
eventually shutting down. The ES, CHP, and DH industries constitute a
substantial portion of combustion plants across Europe. Some
countries may soon see the shutdown of many of their power
generating plants (ES and CHP). For example, looking at Table 1 we
see that Poland and Romania have a relatively large number of plants
that have been opted-out of the ELVs and will shut down. We also see
in Table A1 (appendix) that ES and CHP account for 82 out of 96
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combustion plants in Poland and 71 of 184 plants in Romania. This
implies that these countries may experience a reduction in
conventional capacity to generate power in the coming years; they will
need to take the necessary steps to make up for the loss through new
domestic energy sources or imports from neighboring countries.
We find an unexpected result that the probability of a plant
being opted-out and eventually closed decreases as the amount of coal
or lignite burned increases. It is possible that the solid fuel ELVs are
“too” lenient in the sense that it may be easier for coal plants to meet
the ELVs than policy makers anticipated when writing the legislation.
One piece of supporting evidence for this theory is that the new
Industrial Emissions Directive (IED) significantly tightens ELVs for SO2
and particulate matter for coal plants, while leaving the ELVs
unchanged for gas burning plants for these same pollutants.
Consistent with economic theory, we find that plants in more
concentrated industries are less likely to be opted out. Regulators
considering issues of market power may want to consider this interplay
between environmental regulations and firm concentration as they
design and implement policy. Finally, we analyze countries that
selected to use national reduction plans to achieve the goals set by the
LCPD and find support that these national reduction plans may be
preferred to the command-and-control approach of ELVs. This
suggests that leaders of EU countries may be wise to develop national
plans to comply with EU environmental regulations as these plans can
give them more flexibility to meet overall targets.
We believe that more work is necessary to investigate the
consequences of the LCPD policy across the EU. We have provided a
first look at which plants are opted-out of the LCPD ELVs, but there
remain many unanswered questions regarding the LCPD and the IED.
As mentioned in the conceptual framework, one limitation of our study
is that we do not know whether some of the plants that were optedout would have eventually shut down even if there were no LCPD. It is
possible that some of these plants that were opted-out of the LCPD
would have needed investment in order to continue operating even
without LCPD emission limits. For some plants, the LCPD may have
been the determining factor in the decision to shut down. At the least,
our results suggest that the LCPD could be contributing to plant exit in
certain industries and for certain plants. EU regulators looking for
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further evidence would be wise to survey large combustion plants to
learn more about the opt-out decision, including the firm's motivation
for opting out of the ELVs and what would have happened to the plant
in absence of the LCPD regulation.14
We also believe that more research is warranted in determining
the monetary cost of achieving the LCPD ELVs for certain countries.
That is, when a firm chooses to keep a plant operating, how much
does it cost to achieve the required reductions in sulfur dioxide,
nitrogen oxide, and particulate matter? This question has largely been
answered for many countries, both on an ex-ante and ex-post basis.15
However, other countries (such as Bosnia and Herzegovina) are still
considering joining the EU. As a South East Europe (SEE) Programme
Area country, Bosnia and Herzegovina signed a treaty to adopt and
enforce the LCPD by 2017 (Dimitrijević et al., 2011; Dimitrijević and
Tatić, 2012). Answering this cost question for SEE countries requires
detailed information about the production processes at specific plants
because the marginal costs of reducing emissions can vary widely
depending on plant characteristics.16 Additional research can provide
cost estimates to compare with the benefits of required missions
reduction—namely lower external costs—to find the net benefits of the
legislation for specific regions or countries. We hope that our work
spurs more effort to develop a more complete representation of the
economic consequences of this environmental policy.
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Appendix.
Table A1. Breakdown of plants by Industry and Country
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Note: ES = Electricity Supply, CHP=Combined Heat and Power,
DH = District Heating.
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Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovak, Republic, and United
Kingdom. No firm opted-out of the LCPD in the other 10
countries.
4

For a standard textbook treatment of the topic, see Tietenberg
and Lewis (2012). Harrington et al. (2004) compare the cost
effectiveness of various command-and-control and incentive
based policies in the United States and Europe.
5

For more information on the LCPD please also see Meyer and
Pac (2013).
6

30 of the opted-out plants report 0 energy input by 2007
whereas 151 of the non opted-out plants do so.
7

The latest data are available at http://www.eea.europa.eu/dataand-maps/data/lcp.
8

We use only the first two waves because we are analyzing the
opt-out decision that firms needed to make by 30 June 2004.
Firm attributes in more recent years may not be indicative of
characteristics around the time of the opt-out decision.
9

This essentially forms the universe of large combustion plants
for these 17 countries. However, the sample used for our
regressions is somewhat smaller because observations are
missing for some plants.
10
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MWth has a minimum value of 35 because there is one plant
with reported 35 capacity; as a robustness check we also
removed this plant and results remained consistent.
11

For robustness, we also use construct a second measure of
Herfindahl Index using each plants' MWth; the results are
consistent with Table 5.
12

We average the plant characteristics over the years 2004–2007.
As a robustness check, we examine utilizing only data from
2004 and the results are consistent.
13

Plants in the chemicals industry are removed because they do
not have any plants that were opted-out of the LCPD.
14

We attempted to administer such a survey during Spring 2013
but an extremely low response rate prevented us from
addressing these issues.
15

See, for example, Monier and des Abbayes (2006), for
comparisons of ex-ante and ex-post cost estimates for UK,
Germany, Netherlands, France, Hungary, Italy, and Sweden.
16

Some work has begun in this realm; for example, Dimitrijević
and Tatić (2012) investigate candidate DeSOx and DeNOx
technologies to see which abatement methods are most cost
effective at various coal-fired plants in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
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